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Abstract
The rapid growth of research in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) follows
on two substantial developments. First, the enormous application success of
modern machine learning methods, especially deep and reinforcement learning,
which have created high expectations for industrial, commercial and social value.
Second, the emergence of concern for creating trusted AI systems, including the
creation of regulatory principles to ensure transparency and trust of AI systems.
These two threads have created a kind of “perfect storm” of research activity,
all eager to create and deliver any set of tools and techniques to address the
XAI demand.
As some surveys of current XAI suggest, there is yet to appear a principled
framework that respects the literature of explainability in the history of science,
and which provides a basis for the development of a framework for transparent
XAI. Here we intend to provide a strategic inventory of XAI requirements,
demonstrate their connection to a history of XAI ideas, and synthesize those
ideas into a simple framework to calibrate five successive levels of XAI.
1Authors listed in alphabetical order; R. Goebel (rgoebel@ualberta.ca) is the corresponding
author.
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1. Introduction
Fueled by a growing need for trust and ethical artificial intelligence (AI) by
design, the wake of the last decade of machine learning is crowded with a broad
spectrum of research on explainable AI (XAI).
It is therefore not surprising that the rapid and eclectic flurry of activities in
XAI have exposed confusion and controversy about foundational concepts like
interpretability, explanation, and causality.
Perhaps confusion and disagreement is not surprising, given some of the
complexity of modern learning methods. For example, when some deep learn-
ing methods can build predictive models based on more than 50 million distinct
parameters, it is not a surprise that humans will debate what has been captured
(e.g., see [1]2). Note also the confusion regarding misconceptions on a specious
trade off between predictive accuracy and explainability (cf. [2]), which have
precipitated scientific workshops to address such misconceptions3. Another ex-
ample of yet-to-be-resolved issues includes the strange anomaly where syntactic
reduction of the parameter space of some deep learning created models actually
results in improved predictive accuracy (e.g., [3, 4]). The reality is that the
foundations for scientific understanding of general machine learning, and thus
XAI, is not yet sufficiently developed.
Even though the long history of science and more recent history of scientific
explanation and causality have considerable contributions to make (e.g., [5,
6]), it seems like the demand created by potential industrial value has induced
brittleness in identifying and confirming a robust trajectory from the history
2Especially see Section 2, Chapter 9, The limitations of deep learning.
3Note the 32nd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2018),
Workshop on Critiquing and Correcting Trends in Machine Learning, https://ml-critique-
correct.github.io
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Attributes
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Interactive
Figure 1: Major Explanatory Components and their Potential Role in a Scale of Explanation
of formal systems to modern applications of AI. However, we believe that one
can re-establish some important scientific momentum by exploiting what Newell
and Simon’s Turing Award paper ([7]) identified as the physical symbol systems
hypothesis: “A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means
for general intelligent action.” (p. 116).
The challenge is to clarify connections between the recent vocabulary of
XAI and their historical roots, in order to distinguish between scientifically
valuable history and potentially new extensions. In what follows, we hope to
articulate and connect a broader historical fabric of concepts essential to XAI,
including interpretation, explanation, causality, evaluation, system debugging,
expressivity, semantics, inference, abstraction, and prediction.
To do so, we need to articulate a general, if incomplete XAI framework,
which is immediately challenged to be comprehensive enough to acknowledge
a broad spectrum of components, yet but still avoid becoming a na¨ıve long
and unstructured survey of overlapping – sometimes competing – concepts and
methods. Our approach is to start with a simple structural idea first illustrated
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Attributes Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Explicit Explanation Representation X X X X
Alternative Explanations X X X
Knowledge of the explainee X X
Interactive X
Table 1: Tabular Representation of Levels of Explanation and the Corresponding Attributes
by Figure 1.
One can conceptualize the content of Figure 1 by comparing an accepted
framework around the articulation levels of autonomous driving ([8]). The sim-
ple distinction of degree of human control creates the basis for discussion about
how one could achieve Level 0 (no automation) to Level 5 (full automation),
then discuss the details of those levels and the components necessary to achieve
them.
In our case for explainability, we intend the x-axis of Figure 1 to distinguish
what we consider a kind of quality of explanatory system, with the intuition that
explanations at a higher level can be confirmed as “better” by some evaluation
measure, e.g., we expect a causal explanation to provide the basis for recreating
a causal inference chain to a prediction. We would distinguish, for example
“explanation by authority,” towards the left end of the scale, to be something like
an explanation to the question “why can’t I go out tonight?” to be something
like “Because I said so,” from a parent to a teenager, which we might just
say is explanation by authority. Just these simple distinctions help frame and
motivate a more detailed analysis of distinctions across our informal scale of
levels of explanation, which will be further articulated in what follows.
Note that an alternative to Figure 1, might be a simple abstract comparison
of levels of explanation as a check list of possible components, like in Table 1.
Please note that both representations are intended only to begin to consider
how such components may obtain in any particular XAI system. For example,
our figure and table do not intend the reader to draw the inference that an
XAI system is somehow better with a dialogue component than without, nor
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that any anticipated evaluation of performance is higher with an integration of
more of the components. The idea is only to suggest that there will emerge a
foundation of what XAI components are essential, orthogonal, and have distinct
and value-contributing roles in future XAI systems.
Similarly, our desire for some kind of sensible measures to clarify a level n
explanation from a level n+ 1 explanation creates our speculation on a kind of
y-axis, which is not intended to imply the existence of any measure. Rather our
y-axis is a kind of independent set of plausible orthogonal explanatory system
attributes, which should be distinguished clearly enough to be able to use each
attribute as a check list of attributes that any explanatory system may or may
not have (cf. Table 1).
For example, most surveys of XAI note the requirement for a system to
produce alternative explanations; simply put, producing a single explanation
may be completely insufficient for multiple explainees [9]. Similarly, many have
noted the value of interactive XAI systems and dialogue systems [10], which
provide a basis for an explainee to submit and receive responses to questions
about a model prediction, and thus build deeper trust of the system.
In what follows, we will provide increasing detail and precision about how
we believe existing XAI concepts align with this simple framework, in order to
consider how to articulate choices in the design of an XAI system.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents what we con-
sider the principal components of XAI, including that explanations need to be
explainee-specific, that there can always be multiple explanations, and that the
evaluation of the quality of explanation has more to do with the explainee than
the explanation system. This will help provide sufficient detail to articulate
the relationship between current explanatory concepts and their relationship
to historical roots, e.g., to consider the emerging demands on the properties
of a formal definition of interpretability by assessing the classical formal sys-
tems view of interpretability. Section 3 considers the more general history of
explanation, as an attempt to connect the formal philosophy and scientific ex-
planation foundations. This concludes with the articulation of the explanatory
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role of recent theories of causal representation. Section 4 summarizes impor-
tant emerging trends and components in proposed XAI architectures, including
those that apply to both machine-learned predictive models and general AI sys-
tems. Section 5 provides a synopsis of current XAI research threads, and how
they might integrate into an emerging XAI architecture. The opinions include
the description of important XAI ideas like pre-hoc versus post-hoc explanation
creation, and the evaluation of explanations, in order to sketch an architecture
of how necessary components for XAI are connected. Finally Section 6 provides
a brief summary, and what we believe the future architectures of XAI systems
will require to ensure the trust of future AI systems.
2. Principal Components at the foundations of XAI
2.1. Explainability and Interpretability
There is a confusion in the literature regarding the definitions of inter-
pretability and explainability of models. Many recent papers use those terms
interchangeably [11], [12]. Some papers do make a distinction between those
terms, but we do not agree with those definitions as well. For example, Gilpin
et al. [13] define interpretability as a rudimentary form of explainability. Rudin
[14] finds that there is no single definition on interpretability. However, the
author defines a spectrum which extends from fully interpretable models such
as rule-based models (that provide explanations by definition) to deep models
that cannot provide explanations out of the box.
We note that there is no confusion about interpretation, explainability and
semantics in the case of the history of mathematical logic (e.g., [15]). When
the vocabulary of the representation (well-formed formulae) is precise, inter-
pretability is obtained by ensuring that each component is assigned a fixed
interpretation (e.g., constants to individuals in a world, variables range over
constants, truth values to logical connectives, etc.). And the semantic interpre-
tation of any expression is determined compositionally by interpretation of an
expression’s components.
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But the manner in which representations emerge in the context of empirical
developments in machine learning has not typically been guided by any adap-
tion of extension of the systems of interpretability and semantics of logic. Our
perspective is that the principles of mathematical logic can be easily adopted
to a broad range of machine learned representations, in order to help humans
understand learned representations.
In this context, an interpretable model is one that a human user can read or
inspect, and analyze in terms of composable parts. In this way, interpretability
refers to a static property of the model, and can vary from fully interpretable
(models such as a small decision tree), to deep neural network models in which
interpretability is more complex and typically limited. For instance, consider
what each layer learns in a convolutional neural network (CNN): early layers
are responsible for extracting low-level features such as edges and simple shapes,
while later layers usually extract high-level features whose semantics are under-
stood with respect to an application domain. In fact, with this perspective,
models such as deep neural networks could hardly be classified as interpretable.
It is important to point out that interpretability applies to the interpretation a
learned model before considering the inference the model can do. Note that we
are against classifying models as interpretable or non-interpretable, but rather
we believe there should be a spectrum allowing an interpretability score to be
assigned to each model.
On the other hand, explainability has to deal with what kind of output the
system provides to the user, rather than how a human user directly interprets
the meaning of each model component. In other words, explanation has to do
with clarifying the reason or reasons a prediction was made or an action was
taken. Thus, we define an explainable model as a system which is capable of
providing explanations without doing any extra computation. Explainability
is, thus a dynamic property of a model, in the sense that it requires runtime
information to produce explanations. Explainability pertains to the mechanism
of justification provided for an inference or prediction using a learned model,
whether the used model is clearly interpretable or loosely interpretable. Figure 2
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illustrates the distinction between interpretability, which concerns the rendition
or comprehension of a predictive model learned from data during training, and
explainability, which pertains to the elucidation and justification of a prediction
or decision made in the presence of a new observation or case. Both may revert
to and rely on the original training data for analogy or grounds for justification.
Figure 2: Interpretability of a model vs. Explainability of a prediction.
Based on the above definitions, models such as decision trees and rule-based
systems that are considered transparent (i.e., they are generally considered to-
ward the fully-interpretable end of the transparency spectrum) are also explain-
able, while deep models are not. For example, once we add an explanation
module to the deep neural model (e.g., [16]), they become explainable systems
as well but, interpretation of their meaning can be either in terms of how models
are learned or what predictions mean (i.e., their interpretation in their applica-
tion domain).
Notice that these distinctions between explainability and interpretability do
not comply with a reasonable assumption that is true in a common sense usage
of the terms: outside of the AI arena, it is reasonable to expect explainability
requires interpretability; one can only explain something they fully understand
and can interpret. That stems from our definition of explainability: in AI, an
explanation carries a completely different meaning from the one of its usual
usage. Even a saliency map which highlights areas of an image is considered
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to be (to some extent) an explanation of an image classification system. That
“explanation” does not consider image semantics, it is just an objective iden-
tification of which pixels contribute more to the final activations in a neural
network. Still, they can be especially useful as debugging tools for machine
learning practitioners (see Subsection 2.3).
2.2. Alternative explanations: who are explanations for?
According to [17], a person’s background knowledge, often called prior knowl-
edge, is a collection of “abstracted residue” that has been formed from all of
life’s experiences, and is brought by everyone, at any age, to every subsequent
life experience, as well as used to connect new information to old.
As such, it becomes clear that, in the context of XAI, systems should be able
to effectively take background knowledge into consideration in order to connect
predictions and predictive models, and to shape explanations to the appropriate
level of detail, i.e., adjusting explanations to conform to the knowledge of the
corresponding explainee. However, the most common current approaches to
explainability in AI systems attempt to provide information on a model’s inner
functioning without regard for the consumer of that information (see Subsection
2.3).
To illustrate the importance of considering the explainee (and hence his/her
background knowledge, expectations, etc.), consider an interview by Richard
Feynman with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 1983, in which
he was asked why magnets with the same poles repel each other when placed
close enough [18]. Feynman argues that, to properly explain that behaviour,
he would need to consider the reporter’s background on that matter, and any
answer provided could unfold a new round of questions and explanations; and
this process could continue indefinitely as new details are provided to explain
the previous answer. The point is, of course, that an explanation’s satisfaction
with this iterative dialogue is the foundation of how XAI systems should be
evaluated (cf. Subsections 2.2, and 5.3).
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2.3. Debugging versus explanation
As mentioned above, some approaches to explainability provide information
related to how the model works internally. However, not all information pro-
vided by those approaches can really be considered domain explanatory infor-
mation. Of course, the information provided by, e.g., rule-based systems can be
understood as a detailed explanation on how the system operates and could be
applicable in scenarios where an end user needs to understand how the system
generated a prediction. However, other approaches (especially those applicable
to the so called opaque or black-box systems) are way less informative, and can
be considered superficial “hints” rather than actual explanations, e.g., saliency
maps on convolutional neural networks. This is really an observation about
understanding internal components so as to debug those mechanisms, not as
explanation. Although explanation-wise constrained, these approaches are still
useful on helping to understand how a model behaves, especially if the consumer
of the information has the necessary background. Hence, they may be consid-
ered debugging techniques for opaque AI systems rather than production of
explanations based on a user’s understanding of the semantics of an application
domain.
One example of a debugging tool to augment a model is the work of [19], in
which the authors used a ResNet [20] to recognize objects in a scene. Applying
a saliency map to figure out what area in the image was contributing more to
the final activations is not really helpful for a (lay) human consuming the model
output to understand misclassifications, but it may help a researcher at design
time to figure out alternatives to overcome the model limitations. In this case,
the authors augmented the model by post-processing the final results using an
external knowledge graph to add semantic context and modify the confidence
score of the recognized objects.
An alternative, perhaps more foundational model, is presented by Evans
and Greffenstette in [21], who articulate an inductive logic programming (ILP)
framework in which explanatory models are identified in the space of all possible
inductive logic programs. This framework requires the development of a mea-
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sure space for all such ILP instances, in which a gradient can be determined.
But the positive consequences of that technical maneuver is that an instance of
an inductive logic program can be interpreted at the level of the semantics of
an application domain, all the way down to instructions for a Turing machine.
This framework does not resolve the challenge of what an appropriate level of
explanation should be for a particular explainee; but it does provide a rich and
mathematically elegant space in which to identify everything from descriptions
of computation to arrive at a predictive model all the way to rule-based speci-
fications at the level of an application domain.
2.4. Is there a trade off between explanatory models and classification accuracy?
Deep learning-based systems became prevalent in AI especially after its suc-
cessful applications in image classification problems. Deep learning-based sys-
tems achieve impressive accuracy rates on standard datasets (e.g., ImageNet
[22]) without requiring much effort on designing and implementing handcrafted
rules or feature extractors. In fact, by leveraging transfer learning techniques
and well known architectures based on convolutional neural networks, a deep
learning practitioner can quickly build an image classifier outperforming image
classification methods which were state of the art before the “deep learning
revolution.”
Nevertheless, despite their excellent overall accuracy, deep learning systems
are considered black-boxes unable to provide explanations as to why they make
a given prediction. In some applications, that limitation does not translate into
a serious practical problem: a mobile phone picture classification application
which misclassifies two animals will not bring consequences to a user other than
a few giggles and a funny discussion topic at friends gatherings. If those errors
are seldom, nobody would really care or lose confidence on the application.
Errors may come up in random images and could be induced. Figure 3 shows
an example of a panda picture being classified as a gibbon after some adversarial
noise is added [23].
The above example illustrates it is possible to intentionally fool a classifier
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Figure 3: A panda image mistakenly classified as a gibbon after noise is added [23].
through addition of appropriate noise. Depending on the image classification
application, that kind of error may produce more serious consequences than the
hypothetical phone application mentioned above. For example, recently hackers
were able to fool Tesla’s autopilot by tampering speed limit signs with adhesive
tape (see Figure 4), making the car to accelerate to 85 mph.
Figure 4: A modified speed limit sign reads as 85 mph on the Tesla’s heads-up display [24].
This is a simple example which illustrates predictions from AI models can-
not be blindly accepted in many practical applications. Moreover, techniques
unable to explain how they arrive at a prediction make them even more sensitive
to random errors or deliberate attacks. That observation raises an important
question around a potential trade off between model accuracy and explanatory
capabilities: it is true that a deep learning-based model can achieve accuracy
in many practical applications. That allows practitioners to quickly build accu-
rate models with not so much effort. However, some preconditions do exist, the
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main one being the availability of potentially large labelled datasets (a problem
potentially alleviated by transfer learning, but still common in machine learning
in general and in deep learning techniques in particular). In some cases, training
large state of the art deep learning networks requires thousands of even millions
of dollars (the estimated cost of training just one of models developed in [25]
was estimated in US$1.4 million [26]). All considered, it is not appropriate to
claim there is necessarily a trade off between accuracy and explainability (or
more generally, model performance). In some cases, deep learning methods will
not be able to provide state of the art results (e.g., when there is not enough
labelled data, when the model is so large it will be impractical to deploy on the
target platforms, or even train due to prohibitive costs, etc.) so more expla-
nation capable techniques might even provide better results. But as previously
noted, there is no reason in principle that induced models like decision trees
should in principle be less accurate than deep learned models.
2.5. Assessing the quality of explanations
Whereas a factually wrong explanation is obviously inappropriate, deter-
mining if an explanation is good transcends its correctness. The quality of an
explanation is a little like beauty; it is in the eye of the beholder. It is very clear
(and quite common) that two factually correct, but different explanations could
be considered good or bad depending on to whom they were provided. This
means that, to assess quality of explanations, one (again) needs to consider the
explainee, the person who receives the explanation (see Subsection 2.2). The ex-
plainee’s background, expectations, goals, context, etc., will play a determinant
role in the evaluation process.
From the above paragraph, it is clear that assessing the quality of explana-
tions is subjective, and a quite complicated task, even if done manually. Thus,
coming up with an effective technique to evaluate explanation capabilities is be-
yond the reach of currently available methods. In fact, automatic evaluation of
any generative model is a difficult task. Metrics commonly used for translation
systems such as BLEU [27] or for automatic summarization such as ROUGE
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[28] are not appropriate for more sophisticated tasks such as explainability or
even dialogue systems, since they assume that valid responses have significant
word overlap with the ground truth responses [29].
For that reason, most evaluation methods for explainability systems require
human intervention. For example, the organizers of a fake news detection com-
petition4 which requires an explanation of why a given statement is considered
fake news or not, split the competition in two phases and limited the explana-
tions assessment to the second phase to which only 10 teams would be qualified,
thus making it manually tractable.
The history of evaluation in the field of data visualization is also relevant
to the question of how to evaluate explanations. The initial focus on alterna-
tive visual renderings of data have, over a decade, transformed from whether a
visualization was “interesting” to consideration for what human inferences are
enabled by alternative visualization techniques (e.g., [30]).
The simplest conceptual alignment is that a visualization is a visual expla-
nation. The compression of a large volume of data to a visualization picture is
lossy and inductive, so the choice of how to create that lossy inductive picture
or explanation is about what inferences to imply for the human visual system.
The evaluation of alternative visualizations has evolved to a framework where
evaluation is about what inferences are easily observed (e.g., [31]). Furthermore,
interactive visual explanation is easily considered as our suggestion of explana-
tion being interactive and driven by the semantics of the application domain
(e.g., [32]).
Evaluation of what we can consider as a more general explanatory frame-
work, which produces alternative explanations in terms of text, rules, pictures,
and various media, can similarly be aligned with the evolution of how to evaluate
visual explanations.
But of course there is yet no clear explanation evaluation framework, but
only a broad scope of important components (e.g., [9]). Even specific instances
4https://leadersprize.truenorthwaterloo.com/en/
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of proposals for explanation evaluation beg the need for increased precision.
For example, [25] suggest explanation quality is dependent on two main factors:
sensibleness and specificity. A measure which takes those factors into account
(Sensibleness and Specificity Average - SSA). This suggestion arose from work
on the topic of dialogue systems, and has been characterized in terms of a
high correlation with another measure called “perplexity:” a measurement of
how well a probability distribution or probability model predicts a sample. A
low perplexity indicates the probability distribution is good at predicting the
sample. In the context of conversational systems, perplexity measures the un-
certainty of a language model, which is a probability distribution over entire
sentences or texts. The lower the perplexity, the more confident the model is in
generating the next token (character, subword, or word). Thus, perplexity can
be understood as a representation of the number of choices the model is try-
ing to choose from when producing the next token. This measure is commonly
used to assess the quality of conversational agents and as a metric which must
be optimized by machine learning based dialogue models. Thus, although not
ideal and lacking specific experiments on the domain of explainability, perplex-
ity could potentially be effectively used to evaluate text-based XAI systems as
a reasonable approximation of human evaluation.
While we have more to say about evaluation below, what is clear is that eval-
uation of explanatory systems is based on how the explainee confirms their own
understanding of an explanation or the conclusion of an explanatory dialogue.
3. A brief history of explanation
3.1. Abduction
Explanations have always been an indispensable component of decision mak-
ing, learning, understanding, and communication in the human-in-the-loop en-
vironments. After the emergence and rapid growth of artificial intelligence as a
science in the 1950s, an interest in interpreting underlying decisions of intelligent
systems also proliferated. Especially, C.S. Peirces hypothesis of abduction [33]
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stimulated the AI communitys attention to exploiting this conceptual framework
for the design and development of complex expert systems in a variety of do-
mains. Abduction or abductive reasoning is a form of reasoning that starts with
a set of observations and then uses them to find the most likely explanations
for the observations.
A compressed historical journey of Peirce’s ideas can be traced in four
projects, beginning with Pople [34], Poole et al. [35], Muggleton [36], to Evans
et al. [21]. In 1973, Pople provided a description of an algorithm to imple-
ment abductive and showed its application to medical diagnosis. Poole et al.
extended abductive ideas to a full first order implementation and showed its
application to guide the creation of explanatory hypothesis for any application
domain. Muggleton produced a further refined system called inductive logic pro-
gramming, in which creation of hypotheses are generally identified by inductive
constraints in any general logic. Finally, the adoption of this thread of mecha-
nisms based on abductive reasoning have been generalized to the full scope of
explanation generation based on inductive logic programming by Evans et al.
Every instance of these contributions relies on a logical architecture in which
explanations arise as rational connections between hypotheses and observations
(cf. scientific explanation). The most recent work by Evans et al. extends
the framework in a manner that supports modern heuristics of inductive model
construction – or learning of predictive models – by providing the definition of
a gradient measure to guide search over alternative inductive logic programs.
In fact, that thread of exploiting abduction in Artificial Intelligence is aligned
with perspectives from other disciplines. For example, Eriksson and Lindstro¨m
describe abductive reasoning as an initial step of inquiry to develop hypothe-
ses where the corresponding outcomes are explained logically through deductive
reasoning and experimentally through inductive reasoning [37]. Their applica-
tion to “care science” is just another example that confirms the generality of
abductive reasoning.
The block diagram of Figure 5, partially inspired by a figure in [38], is
intended only to confirm the connection between abductive, deductive, and in-
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ductive reasoning. We see that abductive reasoning entails justification of ideas
that support the articulation of new knowledge by integrating deductive and in-
ductive reasoning. In Artificial Intelligence studies, the process involving these
reasoning steps are as follows: 1) identify observations that require explanation
as they cannot be confirmed with already accepted hypotheses; 2) identify a new
covering hypothesis using abductive reasoning; 3) empirical consequences of the
hypothesis, including consistency with already known knowledge, is established
through deduction; 4) after an accepted level of verification, the hypothesis is
accepted as the most scientifically plausible.
Figure 5: The process steps of the reasoning methods
3.2. Scientific explanation
The connection between Artificial Intelligence frameworks for abductive ex-
planation have suggested a direct connection between “scientific explanation,”
and is the subject of many debatable issues in the community of science and
philosophy [5]. Some of the discussions imply that there is only one form of
explanation that may be considered scientific. There are also some proponents
of the idea that a theory of explanation should include both scientific and other
simpler forms of explanation. Consequently, it has been a common goal to for-
mulate principles that can confirm an explanation a scientific explanation. As
far back in history as Aristotle, generally is considered to be the first philoso-
pher to articulate an opinion that knowledge becomes scientific when it tries to
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explain the causes of “why”. His view urges that science should not only keep
facts, but also describe them in an appropriate explanatory framework [39].
In addition to this theoretical view, empiricists also maintain a belief that the
components of ideas should be acquired from perceptions with which humans
become familiar through sensory experience. The development of the princi-
ples of scientific explanation from this perspective prospered with the so-called
Deductive-Nomological (DN) model that was described by Hempel in [40], [41],
[42], and by Hempel and Oppenheim in [43].
The DN model is based on the idea that two main elements form a scientific
explanation: An explanandum, a sentence that outlines a phenomenon to be
explained, and an explanan, a sentence that is specified as explanations of that
phenomenon. For instance, one might constitute an explanandum by asking
“Why did the dish washer stop working?” and another person may provide an
explanan by answering “Because the electricity went off.” We may infer that
the explanan is rationally or even causally connected to the explanandum, or
at least that the explanandum is the reasonable consequence of the explanans,
otherwise speaking [44]. In this way, the explanation delivered as an explanans
becomes a form of deductive argument and constitutes the “deductive” part
of the model. Note that a series of statements comprises an explanan should
comply with “laws of nature.” This is a vital property, because derivation of the
explanandum from the explanan loses its validity if this property is violated [5].
This is the nomological component of the model, where the term “nomological”
means “lawful.” Hempel and Oppenheims DN model formulation states that a
scientific explanation is an answer to a so-called “why” question, and there may
be multiple such answers. There may also be several types of questions (e.g.,
“How does an airplane fly?”) that cannot be converted into why-questions.
Consequently, answers to such questions are not considered to be scientific ex-
planations. This does not mean that such answers are not part of a scientific
discipline; these answers just become descriptive rather than being explanatory
[45], and is related to our next section on causality.
Another aspect of the DN model is that the elements of an explanation
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are statements or sentences describing phenomenon, not the phenomenon itself.
Finally, the sentences in the explanans must be accurate and verified, urging
the arguments of the scientific explanation to be valid and sound. Thus, the
DN model can be summarized as a model of a scientific explanation outlining a
conception of explanation and a connection in the flow of an explanation.
3.3. Causality
As hinted in the summary of scientific explanation, perhaps the most strict
form of explanation is causal explanation. Informally, a casual explanation
is one that arises from the construction of causal models, which require that
explanations for arising predictions are in face “recipes” for reconstruction that
prediction.
Causal models typically facilitate the creation of explanation for a phenom-
ena or an answer to a query by constructing a formal expression. That formal
expression is derived from some causal representation, which typically captures
directed causal relationships in a graphical model of cause and effect (or causal-
ity). This representation encodes an incomplete set of assumptions built upon
prior knowledge. The causal explanation expression is, as with abduction and
scientific explanation, revised continuously until a suitable explanation is ob-
tained, and can answer the particular query.
The most relevant and recent framework of causal representation and rea-
soning is given by the culmination of Pearl’s research in [6]. In that work, an
abductive explanation is called an “estimand.” This idea of a formal expres-
sion that best explains a particular phenomena (or a query) has its root in
formal philosophy, as noted about, and especially in abductive reasoning. As
noted above, abductive reasoning is given a set of incomplete observations (or
assumptions as described above) and seeks to construct an explanation which
best describes it (or the estimand).
An important point here is that the overall information architectures of ab-
duction, scientific reasoning, and causal reasoning are similar, but their mecha-
nism and the evaluation of an explanation are successfully refined.
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3.4. Explaining mechanism/syntax versus semantics
A lingering unaddressed distinction is about the content or meaning of an
explanation, especially in the context of what counts as an explanation to a
user. Again a principled distinction exists in the realm of mathematical logic (cf.
[15]; any logic textbook will suffice). In the context of predictions from domain
models (whether learned or fabricated by hand), a prediction has at least two
kinds of explanation. For example, consider the simple familiar syllogism
• All men are mortal.
• Socrates is a man.
• Socrates is mortal.
Consider “Socrates is mortal” as a prediction of the very simple model. From
the perspective of formal logic, there are (at least) two explanations. One is
the explanation of the deductive mechanism that produced “Socrates is moral”
from the first two expressions. This a so-called proof-theoretic explanation as
it amounts to a description of how two premises are combined by deductive
inference to derive the prediction. In an analogy with programming language
debuggers, this kind of explanation is about the mechanism that produced the
prediction, and is akin to how current work in explaining image classification
(e.g., [16]). This kind of explanation is appropriate when the explainee has
interest in understanding and debugging the mechanism.
But note an alternative explanation is not about mechanism but about the
meaning of the expressions. Logically, the proof theory or deductive chain ex-
planation is about mechanism. But the semantic explanation is about what it
means to be mortal and what it means to be a man. That kind of explanation
is semantic, and is intended to be appropriate for an explainee who is not in-
terested in mechanism but in meaning. If a prediction was “Socrates is a duck”
obtained from the same system, it can immediately be viewed with suspicion
because of its meaning, not because of the mechanism that produced it from a
presumably faulty model.
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So distinguishing syntax from semantics or meaning has more to do with the
internal rules that a system has to follow to compute something. We all know
that symbolic debuggers for programming languages create labels and traces
which become the basis for producing mechanism explanations. The computa-
tion rules themselves might not be sufficient to provide a clear picture on why
a system came to a conclusion (or an answer to a query). But interpretation of
syntactic expressions is what creates asemantic interpretation. Returning to the
idea of estimands, an estimand can be viewed as a well-constructed expression
if it makes sense semantically. As with the simple syllogism above, the form of
the explanation can be based on that of the causal (or any) model.
In this era of deep learned models, we can consider these relationships be-
tween syntax and semantics as the internal representations of each layer and
their composition at the final layer respectively. Interestingly, this notion of
construction of semantics (whole) as a function of semantics of its parts and
their careful combination that obeys a particular syntax is very familiar in the
logics to interpret natural language, developed by a famous linguist-logician,
Richard Montague [46]. At the syntactic level we might infer the correlation
among different variables (in the intermediate layers) of a deep learned system
but in semantic level we know what combination of those variables (in the final
layer) provide an interpretation for a particular query. Ontology driven expla-
nation for a ResNet model [19] described in Section 2 is one good example of
the use of semantics to explain an opaque system.
4. Classification of Current Research Trends
In the last five years, there has been a surge in the papers attempting to
introduce new explanation methods. This intensity of work in XAI is, in fact, a
side effect of widespread use of AI in sensitive domains such as legal reasoning
and the medical field. In this section, we review some of the various explanation
approaches popular in the literature, and classify in our framework based on
how the explanations are built, and compare that with the levels of explanation
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introduced in Section 1.
4.1. Concurrently constructed explanations
Some have focused on creating models that try to build explanations concur-
rently together with the main task (e.g., learning a classifier). As an example,
consider the work of [47] who seek to identify segments of text that support
an explanation of text review classification. Their approach proposes a neural
architecture that is made up of a generator followed by an encoder component.
The generator extracts portions of the input text as salient words, then forwards
them to the encoder to predict the target class. The final output of the system
comprises the class label, together with the extracted “justification” from the
input text. Other similar work, applied beyond text to images and text, has
relied on learning attention weights from the input. In the related work, some
authors referred to this category as learning interpretable representations.
In natural language processing (NLP) text classifications for instance, atten-
tion layers attempt to learn the weight of each latent representation produced
by the recurrent layer. The attention weights are then used to explain the pre-
diction made by the classifier [48]. There is a debate in the literature on whether
attention weights could be used as an explanation or not [49, 50]. An interesting
connection is to our discussion above regarding the difference between debug-
ging explanations and semantic explanations; much of this research is motivated
to equate a mechanism behaviour to semantic interpretability.
4.2. Post-hoc explanations
Another approach is to use a post-hoc technique. The basic idea is to approx-
imate explanations from a trained model. As mentioned earlier, concurrently
constructed explanations need to be computed within the model, which means
they need to have access to the internals of the model, or what many refer to
as model-dependent (this further creates confusion about whether a model is
syntactic or semantic). However, some post-hoc approaches can create approx-
imate explanations without having access to the internals of the model, thus
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could be classified either as model-dependent or model-independent5. In the
next subsection, we will briefly discuss the difference between model-dependent
and model-independent.
4.2.1. Model-dependent explanations
To describe model-dependent explanations, consider the case of non-linear
deep networks. One can use a back-propagation algorithm to learn feature
importance (e.g., which pixels contributed most in classifying the image as a
cat rather than a dog) then use that learned feature ranking as the basis for
explaining predictions. The simplest general approach is to compute a gradient
with respect to the predicted class and use the back-propagation to propagate
the gradient to the input. Finally, one can combine the input with the gradient
to capture the salient pixels which can be used to explain the predicted class
(e.g., Grad-CAM [51]).
4.2.2. Model-independent explanations
The goal of this group of methods is to focus more on explaining individual
instances without the target model being exposed. In fact, the target model is
now a black-box model. Ribeiro et al. introduced LIME [52] to approach the
explanation problem using a perturbation method. They perturb the original
data point to create a new dataset in the vicinity of that instance. The black-box
model is queried to get the labels associated with the aforementioned points.
This labelled dataset is then used to frame a near enough justification. While
LIME is the most cited model-independent method, there are other approaches
which can be classified as model-independent [53, 54].
4.3. Application-dependent vs. generic explanations
Another way to classify explanation methods is to consider how an explana-
tion mechanism is related to the application domain of the task. An application-
dependent method implicitly assumes the explainee is knowledgeable about the
5Sometimes, this is called model-agnostic post-hoc explanations.
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application and thus it employs the domain’s vocabulary. In a medical applica-
tion, for instance, a system can explain the prediction using medical terms. A
generic explanation, on the other hand, can only provide explanations based on
the mechanism of model building, combined with information available in the
training set (e.g., correlation between features). Note that a model-dependent
method is not necessarily taking into account the knowledge of the explainee
(i.e., it will provide the same explanation irrespective of the customers’ knowl-
edge), but it must take advantage of the application’s vocabulary (see Subsec-
tion 2.3). It is also noteworthy that the system needs to go beyond correlative
features — which is how most current machine learning methods work — to be
capable of providing such application-dependent explanations. Many explainees
(e.g., physicians, lawyers) would prefer having application-dependent explana-
tions. This will not be achieved without moving the machine learning research
on explanation toward scientific and casual explanation.
4.4. Classification based on levels of explanation
As described briefly in Section 1, different levels of explanation could be
introduced as shown in Figure 1. Here we want to further elaborate those
abstract levels and classify the related work accordingly. Table 2 classifies some
of the most prominent existing work based on the levels of explanation. Most of
recent research have focused on Level 1, and only a few have worked on Level 2.
To the best of our knowledge there is as yet no existing work on Levels 3 and 4.
However, there are some conceptual approaches that aim to achieve such levels
[55]. In the subsections below, we provide details.
4.4.1. Level 0
Models classified as Level 0, provide no explanation at all. They are, in
essence, black-box models that cannot provide any explanatory information to
a user. In other words, the explainee is expected to accept or reject a system’s
decision without any further information. Most off-the-shelf methods for learn-
ing classifiers (e.g., deep learned models, support vector machines, or random
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Method Level MD/MI CC/PH
LIME [52] 1 MI PH
Grad-CAM [51] 1 MD PH
SHAP [53] 1 MI PH
Rationalizing-predictions [47] 1 MD CC
Grounding visual explanations [56] 2 MD PH
Table 2: Classification of recent explanation techniques based on Levels of Explanation. MD
stands for Model-Dependent while MI means Model-Independent. CC corresponds to Con-
currently Constructed explanations and PH refers to Post-Hoc technique.
forests) belong to this level.
4.4.2. Level 1
The explainee is provided with a single type of explanation in models falling
into this category. For example, a framework that provides heat-maps to explain
image classification belongs to this level. Most of this approach focuses on
providing a post-hoc explanation, which transitions a black-box model —that
originally belonged to Level 0— to a Level 1 model. Recently, however, a
few methods have been proposed to look at building concurrently constructed
explanation algorithms [47, 57] to make models that by definition belong to
Level 1.
4.4.3. Level 2
Level 2 adds another type of explanation to enrich the knowledge communi-
cated with the explainees. At this level, the system not only provides a heat-map
to explain a classified animal image as a cat, but it also contains another type
of explanation such as a textual explanation as an alternative description of the
predicted classification. In this way, the alternative explanations allows the user
to grasp more insights about the reasoning process employed by the system to
make the prediction. If one explanation is not well understood by the explainee,
then they have the opportunity to understand from an alternative explanation.
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Note that in the case of the abductive systems described above, there can be a
large number of alternative explanations.
4.4.4. Level 3
An explainee and their familiarity with the domain plays a vital role in this
level. The explanatory system includes some model of the explainee’s domain
model, and is capable of deciding the right type of explanation according to
the knowledge of the explainee. For instance, a patient is diagnosed with some
disease and an AI system is used to provide a potential treatment therapy.
While the therapist requires a detailed medical explanation by the AI system,
the patient would strongly prefer to have a lay person’s explanation for any
alternative treatment recommendations.
In the current context of the COVID-19 pandemic as an example, Hydrox-
ychloroquine is alleged to be a potential cure and has attracted many ordinary
people’s attention around the globe. People are interested to understand why
this drug is a potential treatment. As a result, many medical researchers pro-
vide interviews to the media explaining how this drug works, typically with
very shallow detail. As we can expect, however, the same experts would use a
different level of granularity to explain the drug to other experts. Please note
that, none of the existing explanation methods take into account the knowledge
of the explainee.
4.4.5. Level 4
While previous levels (e.g., Level 0, 1, and 2) do not include the capability of
interaction between the explainee and the system except perhaps for at most one
interaction (Level 3), methods classified as Level 4 can interact with the user.
They are expected to support a conversation sort of capability which allows the
explainee to refine their questions and concerns regarding the decision. In other
words, each interaction in the conversation allows the explainee to get clarifica-
tions. Here, the system is capable of adapting its explanation to the vocabulary
of the explainee. Take the Richard Feynman’s interview [18] with the BBC as
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an example. He could provide the reporter with what he thought the reporter
would understand most. Once the reporter understood that explanation, if he
had further questions, or wanted more in-depth explanation, the reporter could
ask, and an appropriate explanation could be provided by Richard Feynman.
To the best of our knowledge, existing systems lack this interaction capability.
5. Priority Components for a synthesis of an XAI architecture
5.1. XAI architecture
As noted, much of the work on the explainability has focused on deep super-
vised learning, which describe methods that answer the following two questions:
(1) which input features are used to create an output prediction, and (2) which
input features are semantically correlated with the outcome prediction. The
answers for these two questions contribute to the trust in the system, but ex-
planation additionally requires a social process of transferring knowledge to the
explainee considering the background knowledge of the explainee.
While the answers to questions (1) and (2) may acknowledge the importance
of features that a model uses to arrive at a prediction, it may not necessarily
align with a human explanation; prior knowledge, experience and other forms of
approximate reasoning (e.g., metaphorical inference) may further shape an ex-
planation, while the predictions of a machine learning model may be restricted
to the dataset and the semantics around it. Generally, an explanation sys-
tem (for example, a human) is not restricted to the knowledge on which they
make predictions and explanations and can draw parallels with different events,
semantics and knowledge.
So merely responding to questions (1) and (2) do not satisfy the multiple
purposes that XAI researchers aim to achieve: to increase societal acceptance
of algorithmic decision outcomes, to generate human-level transparency about
why a decision outcome is achieved, and to have a fruitful conversation among
different stakeholders concerning the justification of using these algorithms for
decision-making [58].
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To incorporate an interactive “explainer” in XAI, an emerging XAI architec-
ture needs to embed both an explainable model and an explanation interface.
The explainable model includes all types of the pre-hoc, post-hoc and concur-
rent explanation models. As examples of the explainable model, there can be a
causal model, an explainable deep adaptive program, an explainable reinforce-
ment learning model, etc. An explanation interface can be also a variety of
types, such as a visualization system, or a dialogue manager with a query man-
ager and a natural language generator that corresponds to Level-3 and Level-4
of Figure 1.
5.2. User-guided explanation
As Miller [9] notes, the process of explanation involves two processes: (a)
a cognitive process, namely the process of determining an explanation for a
given event, called, as with Hempel, the explanandum. This identifies causes
for the event, and a subset of these causes are selected as the explanation (or
explanans); and (b) a social process of transferring knowledge between explainer
and explainee, generally an interaction between a group of people, in which the
goal is that the explainee has enough information to understand the causes of
the event. This is one kind of blueprint for the Level 4 interactive explanation
process noted above.
Miller provided an in-depth survey on explanation research in philosophy,
psychology, and cognitive science. He noted that the latter could be a valu-
able resource for the progress of the field of XAI, and highlighted three major
findings: (i) Explanations are contrastive: people do not ask why event E hap-
pened, but rather why event E happened instead of some other event F ; (ii)
Explanations are selective and focus on one or two possible causes and not all
causes for the recommendation; and (iii) Explanations are social conversation
and interaction for transfer of knowledge, implying that the explainer must be
able to leverage the mental model of the explainee while engaging in the ex-
planation process. He asserted that it is imperative to take into account these
three points if the goal is to build a useful XAI.
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One should note that it is plausible, given the study of explanation based
on cognitive norms, that an explanation may not be required to be factual, but
rather only to be judged to be satisfactory to the explainee (cf. Subsections 2.5,
and 4.3).
As we described in Figure 1, a dialogue system that can process a question of
“what if another condition” from an explainee and produce a new prediction out-
put based on the new condition will achieve another higher level of explanation.
The explanation that can deal with “What would the outcome be if the data
looked like this instead?” or “How could I alter the data to get outcome X?”
is called contrastive explanation. Contrastive explanation is a human-friendly
explanation as it mimics human explanations that are contrastive, selective, and
social.
To accommodate the communication aspects of explanations, several dia-
logue models have been proposed. Bex and Walton [10] introduce a dialogue
system for argumentation and explanation that consists of a communication
language that defines the speech acts and protocols that allow transitions in
the dialogue. This allows the explainee to challenge and interrogate the given
explanations to gain further understanding. Madumal et al. [55] also proposed
a grounded, data-driven approach for explanation interaction protocol between
explainer and explainee.
5.3. Measuring value of explanations
The production of explanations about decisions made by AI systems is not
the end of the AI explainability debate. The practical value of these expla-
nations, partly, depends on the audience who consumes them: an explanation
must result in an appropriate level of understanding for the receivers of expla-
nations. In other words, explanations are required to be interpreted and judged
against different points, about whether they are good or bad, satisfactory or
unsatisfactory, effective or ineffective, acceptable or unacceptable.
Again the previously mentioned evolution of the evaluation of visualization
systems is highly relevant, as that evolution ultimately requires the design of
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cognitive experiments to confirm the quality and value of alternative explana-
tions, visual or not (see Subsection 2.5). It is clearly the case that quality of a
“visual explanation” is about how well it leads the reader to the intended infer-
ences from the visualized data domain. Naturally, the background knowledge
of a viewer is like the background knowledge of an explainee; their knowledge
and experience determines what preferred inferences obtain.
Looking forward to how to evaluate XAI systems, among those background
assumptions that impact the judgements of explanations are what are returned
to as cognitive “norms.” It has been empirically shown that norms influence
causal judgements [59]. To put it simply, norms are informal rules that are held
by people, and can have statistical or prescriptive content. The empirical and
mathematical aspects for why a decision outcome is achieved are interpreted
against some background assumptions held by the audiences of explanations.
Some disagreements with an explanation for a decision outcome in a sensitive
context due to the background assumptions of the audience of explanations re-
veal some moral or social mismatch about algorithmic decision-making between
the receiver of an explanation and its producer.
If one does not have an appropriate level of knowledge about the relevant
precedent assumptions, one might not have the capacity to judge and interpret
an explanation of a decision. In that case, iteratively refined question-answer
dialogue (cf. Fenyman’s point made in Section 2.2) may lead to an improved
understanding by the explainee. In general the interpretability of explanations
has significant practical value for revealing the explicit and the implicit reasons
about why a decision-making procedure and process is chosen.
A schema for the interpretability of explanations aims to capture various
precedent assumptions that become relevant in context-dependent evaluation of
each kind of AI explanation for why a decision outcome is achieved.
Finally, in another elaboration of how to evaluate explanations [60], there
are proposed five measures of explanation effectiveness: (1) User satisfaction,
(2) Mental model, (3) Task performance, (4) Trust assessment, and (5) Cor-
rectability.
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User satisfaction is measured in terms of clarity of the explanation, and
utility of the explanation. Task performance is to check if the explanation
improved user’s decision and task performance. Trust assessment is to assess
trust and measure if it can be appropriate for future use. Assessment of a
mental model is related to strength/weakness assessment, and it also assesses
the predictions of “what will it do” or what if questions, and “how do I intervene”
to adjust or guide explanatory outputs. Finally, Correctability is to measure if
interaction with the system helps to identify and correct errors. As far as we
are aware, there is also no Level 4 system that has confirmed any experiments
that demonstrate this kind of richly faceted evaluation.
Finally, to measure contrastive explanation that is close to human explana-
tion, we need additional evaluation metrics for contrast, selection, and social
explanation. Contrast can be measured in terms of the clear justification of
the output through the comparison. Contrastive explanation should be able to
explain why the output has been produced between the probable output can-
didates. Selection can be measured in terms of the importance (salience) of
the reasons (features) that were mentioned during the contrastive explanation.
Lastly, social explanation can be measured in terms of the clarity, understand-
ability and utility of the explanation to the explainee. The measure of the social
explanation corresponds to the measure of user satisfaction in [60]. But as noted,
we know of no existing explanation systems that have been so considered with
this rich palette of evaluation parameters.
6. Summary and Conclusions
In summary, our goal has been to articulate a set of required components of
an XAI architecture, and describe a high level framework to understand their
connections. In two alternative graphical depictions (Figure 1, Table 1), we dis-
tinguish what we believe are mostly orthogonal components of an explanation
system, and suggest an information framework related to levels of autonomous
driving, where a richer set of components provides a more sophisticated expla-
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nation system.
That framework is descriptive and informal, but it allows us to factor some
components (e.g., interpretability, explanation quality) into separate analyses,
which we hope creates some line of sight to historical work on explanation. No
where is this more important than the history of abductive reasoning and its
connection to the history of scientific reasoning, culminating in the construction
and use of causal models as a basis for causal explanations.
We then try and consider more recent research in the context of these com-
ponents and their relationship to the analysis of a deeper background literature,
and provide some description of how those early ideas fit, and what they lack.
This culminates with a considering of how to evaluate explanatory systems, and
connects recent work that addresses the cognitive properties of explanations.
Overall, we hope that our framework and analysis provides some connective
tissue between historical threads of explanation mechanisms and modern rein-
terpretation of those mechanisms in the context of cognitive evaluation.
We conclude that there is much still to do to inform a principled design
of a high level explanation system, but that there are many components and
integrating them with the appropriate knowledge representations within ma-
chine learning models, and respecting the cognitive aspects of evaluation, are a
minimal requirement for progress.
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